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Abstract 
Using new estimates of ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) of non-tariff measures (NTMs) over time, 
this paper examines NTMs and tariffs relationship for a sample of 70 economies for 4949 
products at the 6-digit HS level over the period 2003-2015. A panel data methodology models 
the lagged adjustment of NTMs to tariffs, consistent with a causal relationship. Trade policy 
substitution is found when the models are estimated in both levels and changes; with this 
holding for both OECD and non-OECD countries, but not for the agriculture sector in OECD 
countries. Overall, there is fairly complete substitution between policy instruments in absolute 
terms. 
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1. Introduction  
The decline in tariffs over the past two decades due to tariff liberalization associated with 
multilateral, bilateral and regional trade agreements, prompts the question as to what has 
happened to other trade policy instruments as a result of these tariff cuts (Baldwin, 2016; Bown, 
2014; Hoekman and Nicita, 2011). The incidence and level of non-tariff measures (NTMs) are 
widely documented as having grown over the same period (Ghodsi et al., 2017; Nicita and 
Gourdon, 2013; Niu et al., 2018; WTO, 2012). It is natural to consider whether NTMs have 
risen in general and for reasons unrelated to tariff reforms, or whether NTMs have increased 
because of tariff cuts and with greater increases in the use of NTMs being on tariff lines where 
tariff rates have been cut most. Of course an overall picture of falling tariffs and increased use 
of NTMs may hide mix relations at the product or country level, with complementarity 
(declining tariffs and NTMs) in some cases and a preponderance of areas where instrument 
substitution prevails. 
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There is not a clear consensus on this issue to be found in the existing empirical literature. 
Although a significant number of studies find trade policy substitution between tariffs and 
NTMs, this finding is sometimes weak and found mostly for developing countries. Further a 
number of studies identify a heterogeneous relationship determined by country or product 
characteristics (Beverelli et al., 2014; Bown and Tovar, 2011; Broda et al., 2008; Feinberg and 
Reynolds, 2007; Herghelegiu, 2018; Kee et al., 2009; Ketterer, 2016; Limão and Tovar, 2011; 
Moore and Zanardi, 2011; Orefice, 2017; Ronen, 2017; WTO, 2012). Indeed a few studies 
identify a significant complementary relationship between the two trade policy instruments 
(Dean et al., 2009; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005; Lee and Swagel, 1997; Trefler, 1993).  
This paper contributes to this literature by examining the NTM-tariff relationship at a 
disaggregated 6-digit harmonized system (HS) level over the period 2003-2015 for a sample of 
70 economies for 4949 products, using newly available data on non-tariff measures and detailed 
estimates of ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) of NTMs over time. Given the availability of 
estimates over time across economies and products, we adopt a panel data methodology to 
investigate the NTM-tariff relationship in levels and changes. Our empirical approach allows 
us to draw inferences about the causal link between current NTMs and lagged tariffs at the 
detailed product level. Further, the panel nature of the data allows us to control for product-
country and time specific fixed effects, and increase precision in the capturing of the NTM-
tariff relationship at the product level. 
The present paper makes a number of contributions relative to the existing literature. Our 
approach uses ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) of core NTMs and common metric therefore 
across alternative trade policy instruments, both non-tariff and tariff in nature. This is achieved 
by using estimates of AVEs of NTMs, computed using the methodology of Kee et al. (2009), 
at discrete points in time as a first step, that is, three-year intervals over the period 2003-2015 
(Niu et al., 2018). We obtain the tariff equivalent of NTMs affecting each product in each 
importing economies at each point in time, and can thus directly compare the effects on import 
prices of changing NTMs and tariffs (Ronen, 2017). This NTM measure has the merit of being 
estimated econometrically and of dealing explicitly with potential endogeneity of NTMs with 
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respect to imports (and the current or contemporaneous tariff), delivering a ‘clean’ non-tariff 
measure at the product level. It is this AVEs of NTMs that is then used to model the NTM-
lagged tariff relationship.  
In contrast, most extant empirical studies employ proxy measures of NTMs that are not 
directly comparable to tariff rates. In effect, much of this literature focuses on the ‘incidence’ 
of NTMs to establish the NTM-tariff link, where they estimate how tariffs affect the probability 
of NTMs being deployed (see Beverelli et al., 2014; Feinberg and Reynolds, 2007; Herghelegiu, 
2018; Ketterer, 2016; Limão and Tovar, 2011; Moore and Zanardi, 2011; Orefice, 2017), or the 
extent of NTMs through frequency and coverage ratios (see Broda et al., 2008; Lee and Swagel, 
1997; WTO, 2012). The studies by Kee et al. (2009), Limão and Tovar (2011) and Ronen (2017) 
are rare examples that use tariff equivalents of NTMs. However, as outlined below, an 
important limitation facing these studies is the absence of information on NTMs over time and 
the associated constraint of having to model the NTM-tariff relationship in cross section only.  
In the present study we are able to empirically model the usage of trade policy instruments 
over time. The NTM-tariff relationship is investigated in both ‘levels’ and ‘changes’. The latter 
allow us to model how countries have adjusted NTM usage in response to changes in tariffs. 
Moreover, the data structure allows for the explicit modelling of the NTM-lagged tariff 
relationship. This has the technical advantage of reducing concerns over simultaneity (and 
endogeneity) issues associated with current or contemporaneous NTMs and tariffs. It also gives 
greater credibility to any causal interpretation of the impact of lagged tariffs on the AVE of 
NTMs, in particular in the context of political economy processes and administrative 
implementation of adjustments in NTMs that can be expected to take time. This is in contrast 
to existing studies that have confined their estimation to one point in time (see Kee et al., 2009; 
Lee and Swagel, 1997; Limão and Tovar, 2011; Ronen, 2017), or eschewed the kind of dynamic 
aspects of policy adjustment that a panel framework allows.1  
                                                          
1 Several studies use tariff ‘changes’ as their main explanatory variable (see Herghelegiu, 2018; Moore and Zanardi, 
2011; Orefice, 2017), with some solely focused on tariff ‘reduction’ (see Beverelli et al., 2014; Feinberg and 
Reynolds, 2007; Ketterer, 2016), while others use tariff ‘levels’ (see Kee et al., 2009; Ronen, 2017; WTO, 2012).  
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A final contribution and merit of our study is that it is ‘comprehensive’ in nature. It is 
comprehensive in that our tariff equivalent NTMs incorporates the effects of all core NTMs, 
namely, price controls, quantity controls, monopolistic measures, and technical measures. It is 
comprehensive also in terms its disaggregated product (6-digit HS level) coverage. A 
disaggregated study of the NTM-tariff relationship has been argued to be preferable over 
broader industry analysis, as the latter is likely to mask the effect at individual product lines 
and thus provide an inaccurate estimated coefficient on the relationship (see Feinberg and 
Reynolds, 2007; Ketterer, 2016). Some previous studies have been narrowly focused on a single 
specific NTM instrument, such as antidumping, and/or conducted at an industry or sectoral 
level of disaggregation (see Beverelli et al., 2014; Feinberg and Reynolds, 2007; Lee and 
Swagel, 1997; Limão and Tovar, 2011; Moore and Zanardi, 2011; Orefice, 2017). 
In the current analysis we measure the AVE of NTMs in multilateral trade i.e. as an 
average price effect of NTMs on imports from all sources. We do so in order to explore the 
overall relationship between tariff and non-tariff measures, not the relationship between these 
policy instruments with each trading partner separately. Clearly for some purposes one would 
want or need to measure the bilateral AVEs of NTMs. When concerned for example with 
competition in domestic markets by imports from alternative sources, estimates of the AVE of 
bilateral NTMs would be essential. Even where there is variation in a country’s bilateral tariffs 
at the industry level due to tariff preferences arising from bilateral/regional trade agreements of 
preference schemes for developing countries, one should not necessarily expect substitutability 
or complementarity between trade policy instruments to apply in a bilateral setting. WTO rules 
or the threat of retaliation may constrain the use of source-specific NTMs. The obvious 
exception to this is in the case of contingent protection measures, such as AD duties. We do 
not, however, include contingent protection measures for the present purpose in our measure of 
the incidence of core NTMs, in part because such measures are typically targeted on a limited 
set of products and trade partners. Some studies (e.g. Egger and Nelson, 2011) have generated 
estimates of AVEs in bilateral trade in order to investigate the extent to which anti-dumping 
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measures affect bilateral trade flows, but here the aim is to investigate the relationship in the 
use of trade policy instruments (tariffs and core NTMs) in multilateral trade.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature. Section 3 reports on the method and data used to measure the tariff-equivalent of 
NTMs. Section 4 sets out the conceptual framework and empirical specification. The empirical 
findings are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Literature 
Several studies have explored the relationship between tariffs and NTMs. In general, there is 
no consensus, with some theoretical work and empirical work concluding that tariff and NTMs 
are substitutes, while other studies find them to be complements.  
Starting with the theoretical stream of the literature, according to the influential ‘Law of 
Constant Protection’, in order to reach their policy goals, governments operate target levels of 
overall protection towards import products (Bhagwati, 1988). Even with reduction in tariffs 
through successive multilateral and regional trade agreements, governments can turn to greater 
use of NTMs to keep overall protection at the targeted level. The prediction of the law is that 
tariffs and NTMs are substitutes. 
Several attempts at theoretically grounding the NTM-tariff link have been made. Yu (2000) 
provides a political economy explanation of tariff reduction and the NTM-tariff trade-off. Trade 
policy substitution is found to be absent with foreign competition, unless vested interests from 
import-competing firms contribute to government welfare so as to outweigh informed 
consumers’ preference for less trade protection. Anderson and Schmitt (2003) set up a model 
to analyze how trade liberalization affects trade policy. They find that when both tariffs and 
quotas are constrained due to trade agreements commitments, then antidumping policies (as 
non-tariff barrier), are likely to be employed; with quotas being the predominant trade policy 
measure, if only the use of tariffs is constrained. Addressing the question of policy choice 
between tariffs and NTMs, Limão and Tovar (2011) show that tariff reduction commitments 
increase the likely adoption of NTMs and their restrictiveness. Governments are willing to 
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make such commitments even if it means shifting to less efficient NTBs, as it can raise their 
political bargaining value vis-à-vis special interest groups.  
There are also a few studies suggesting a complementary relationship between tariffs and 
NTMs. Vousden (1990) suggests that, depending on the level of pre-existing tariff protection, 
the joint impact of a quota and a tariff on domestic prices could lead to complementarity. 
Another explanation for complementarity can be found in the ‘special interest politics’ model 
of Grossman and Helpman (1994) where the implementation of trade policies are influenced 
by the lobby behavior of interest groups, where increased lobbying for certain important sectors 
drives up both tariff and the NTM protection.  
The study of Essaji (2010) provides an example of a theoretical piece that illustrates the 
possibility of both complementarity and substitutability. Setting up a model where the 
government’s objective function depends on consumer surplus, domestic firm’s profits, 
consumption externality and the tariff revenue, he studies how a tariff reduction could affect 
technical regulations imposed on foreign firms. He finds that if the government cares about the 
negative externality from consuming poor quality products, a tariff reduction could lead to 
higher technical regulations, as the NTM’s marginal impact on the consumption externality is 
important. With the concern about the negative externality, then increased technical regulations 
will substitute for a tariff reduction. However, if the foreign firm has a significant domestic 
presence then a tariff reduction implies consumers face lower prices and improved consumer 
surplus. Though the technical regulation favors the domestic firm and shifts profits to it, 
because consumer surplus is so important, the government could raise welfare not by raising 
the NTM but easing it when cutting the tariff. In this case we have technical regulation and 
tariffs as complements.  
Notwithstanding the above theoretical works, the question of the NTM-tariff relationship 
remains an empirical one. Using an endogenous trade protection lens Trefler (1993) 
investigates how trade policy instruments affect US import policy. He finds tariffs and NTMs 
affect imports in the same direction, suggestive that tariffs and NTMs are complement to each 
other. Lee and Swagel (1997) extend the endogenous protection explanation by using industry-
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level data on production, trade flows and trade barriers for 41 countries. By regressing NTBs 
on tariffs, they find a significant positive complementary link between tariffs and NTBs. 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) in their study of trade liberalization in Colombia find a 
positive NTM-tariff relationship, whereby NTMs were not replacements for tariffs. Dean et al. 
(2009) use city-level retail data to estimate the price effect of NTMs directly on 47 consumer 
products for more than 60 countries in the year 2001. Generally, a higher tariff for a product is 
associated with a higher probability of NTM implementation, depicting NTMs and tariffs as 
complements – though this result doesn’t hold for all product categories. 
A few studies explore the relationship between tariffs and a specific type of NTM, such as 
antidumping (AD) measures. Feinberg and Reynolds (2007) study the spread of AD after a 
comprehensive tariff reduction. They find that tariff reduction after the Uruguay Round 
increased the probability of a country implementing antidumping measures. In other words, the 
antidumping measures substitute for tariffs. Following in similar vein, with a focus on AD, 
Moore and Zanardi (2011) examine how cuts in applied tariff rates affected AD initiations for 
35 countries over the period 1991 to 2002. They find that tariff reductions do not increase the 
probability of AD initiations in general. However, trade policy substitution is observed for a 
few developing economies who rely heavily on AD. Notwithstanding this finding, the 
investigation by Bown and Tovar (2011) of trade reforms in India reveal that large tariff cuts 
did raise the usage of AD and safeguards as alternative policy instruments. Such trade policy 
substitution of specific NTMs for tariff cuts is also reported by Ketterer (2016) for the EU, 
again in the context of AD investigations.   
Another stream of this empirical literature examines NTMs as specific trade concerns 
(STCs) for Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).  
Beverelli et al. (2014) show that policy substitution between tariffs and SPS are observed for 
both developed and developing world, but in the TBT sample this holds only in developed 
countries. Orefice (2017) reports that as a consequence of tariff cuts, SPS and TBT measures 
are used to restrict trade. Herghelegiu (2018) documents substitutability between NTMs and 
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tariffs, where products that experience tariff reductions increase the probability of being 
subjected to NTM protection. 
This finding of ‘substitutability’ has been confirmed by Broda et al. (2008) in their broader 
examination of NTMs. They show the United States set higher NTMs following its 
GATT/WTO tariff commitments, given the limited ability to use tariffs. An empirical 
investigation of the NTM-tariff relationship reported in the 2012 World Trade Report (see 
WTO, 2012), highlights a negative link between coverage and frequency measures of NTMs 
with tariffs, for both SPS and TBT, across countries and HS2 sectors.  
After their estimation of AVEs of NTMs, Kee et al. (2009) use three sets of simple 
regressions, to examine the relationship between their estimated AVEs of NTMs and tariffs. 
Though their estimation with either country fixed effects or product fixed effects included 
reveal a positive tariff-NTM relationship, when both country fixed effects and product fixed 
effects are controlled for, the correlation between tariffs and NTMs becomes negative, 
suggesting policy substitution.  
Two studies ground their estimation of the NTM-tariff relationship on the Kee et al.’s 
methodology to estimate AVEs of NTMs, namely Limão and Tovar (2011) and Ronen (2017). 
The former exploits the variation in tariff constraints to examine the impact on NTMs for 
Turkey. They find evidence of substitution between the two trade policy instruments with tariff 
commitments – due to WTO and trade agreements with the EU – leading to higher AVEs of 
NTMs. However, their finding is of incomplete trade policy substitution as NTMs only partially 
offset for reduced tariff protection. Ronen (2017) reports NTMs substituting for tariffs mostly 
for developing economies, but complement each other in the case of the high-income 
economies. A key feature of all three studies is that the estimated NTM-tariff relationship is 
derived from a cross section estimation strategy.   
In summary, extant studies have generally eschewed the use of a tariff equivalent of NTMs 
that is directly comparable to tariffs. Some of these studies have also tended to focus on specific 
NTM measures and used more aggregated industry-level data. Furthermore, although panel 
estimation is used in some studies, this is not the case for those studies closest to the present 
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one, namely ones using AVEs of NTMs and common metric for measuring the trade barrier 
effect of the two trade policy instruments.  
 
3. Measuring Tariff-Equivalents of NTMs 
Estimating AVEs of NTMs 
The estimation of the AVEs of NTMs follows Kee et al. (2009) to obtain tariff equivalents of 
NTMs at discrete points in time. The full details of the estimation procedure are reported in Niu 
et al. (2018). Here we report in summary on that procedure.  
First, ‘constrained’ imports, with the effect of tariffs allowed for, are taken as the 
dependent variable: the NTM effect being modelled as an additional restriction on import 
quantity (see equation 1 below).2  
ln 𝑚𝑛𝑐 − 𝜀𝑛𝑐 ln(1 + 𝑡𝑛𝑐) = 𝛼𝑛 + (−𝑒
(𝛽𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒+∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑘
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑐
𝑘
𝑘 ))𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐  + ∑ 𝛼𝑛𝑘𝐶𝐶
𝑘
𝑘 +    𝜅𝑛𝑐    (1) 
where 𝑚𝑛𝑐  represents the import volume of product n by country c. It is normalized 
import volume, as the world price is taken as exogenous for all products at unit price. 𝛼𝑛 as the 
product line intercept consists of product characteristics that do not vary across countries. The 
dummy variable 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐 depicts the presence of a core NTM for product n in country c.  
𝑡𝑛𝑐 is the ad-valorem (effectively applied) tariff on product n in country c, and  𝜀𝑛𝑐  time 
invariant import demand elasticity for product n in country c. 𝛽𝑛𝑐
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒  captures the quantity 
effects of the presence of core NTMs, which vary across countries and products.  𝐶𝑐
𝑘 controls 
for country characteristics, with 𝛼𝑛𝑘  being the coefficients for the country-specific 
characteristics.. The country-characteristics include GDP, capital/GDP, labor/GDP, , and 
land/GDP, along with a dummy for islands and the weighted distance to the global market as 
two gravity variables. 
To take full advantage of the data variation, across products and countries, without 
running out of degrees of freedom, the estimation of Eq. (1) allows decomposition into country 
                                                          
2 Although the NTM may be the binding constraint on the quantity of imports, we assume that the tariff barrier would 
remain with the removal of the NTM. 
 10 
 
specific factors and tariff line specific factors. This means that 𝛽𝑛𝑐
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒, the coefficient on core 
NTM incidence, has both country c and tariff line n dimensions.  
Eq. (1) expresses the coefficients for 𝛽𝑛𝑐
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒  in exponential form, such that, the 
coefficients for core NTMs are constrained to be non-positive. 3  This implies regressions 
estimated using nonlinear least square methods. The ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs 
were obtained using the estimated coefficients for 𝛽𝑛𝑐
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒: 
                                  ave𝑛𝑐
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
1
𝜀𝑛,𝑐
∂ln m𝑛𝑐
𝜕𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐
=
𝑒β𝑛𝑐
Core
−1
𝜀𝑛𝑐
                                   (2) 
The AVEs of NTMs were estimated at the detailed product line for initially up to 97 
countries at three-year intervals over the period 1997 to 2015,  specifically for 1997, 2000, 2003, 
2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015 and reported on in some detail in Niu et al. (2018). In the present 
work we concentrate on the post-2003 period, using a consistent classification of NTM 
incidence and consistently broad country coverage (70 countries, with all EU countries treated 
as a single identity).4 
Given the potential endogeneity problem that the incidence of NTMs could be shaped by 
import quantity at the product level, exports, import volume change from the previous period, 
and the GDP-weighted average of the core NTMs for the five geographically neighboring 
countries are included as instrumental variables for the core NTM incidence dummy. The 
endogenous core NTMs dummy variable is modelled using the Heckman-Maddala treatment 
effect regression model, which runs a Probit regression model for each product line using the 
above instruments. The inverse Mills ratio estimated through this procedure is then added in 
estimating eq. (1).  
Note that one could explore the relationship between bilateral tariffs and bilateral AVEs 
of NTMs, we seek here to investigate the relationship in a multilateral context. The incidence 
                                                          
3 NTMs are assumed to exert a restrictive i.e. negative trade effect. The robustness of this assumption was checked 
on. 
4 The EU countries are treated as a single identity because EU countries negotiate as a whole in multilateral trade 
agreements and individual EU countries cannot set their trade policy. We take the simple average of AVEs of NTMs 
at the product level for all EU countries; with new members during the period treated as EU members throughout 
the period. For our sample of countries most of the new members joined the EU in 2004 (only one year after the start 
of our sample period), and as accession countries would have been converging their trade policies with the EU prior 
to membership. 
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of many NTMs, especially the core NTMs concentrated on in the study, does not necessarily 
vary bilaterally. WTO rules constrain the ability of countries to set source-specific NTMs. Of 
course, non-discriminatory NTMs may induce bilateral AVEs that vary across source countries; 
due for instance to varying supply conditions in export countries or variations in product quality 
that induce variation import demand elasticity by source country. Indeed, this variation in 
bilateral AVEs is possible in the presence of both of NTMs and tariffs that are non-
discriminatory between different trade partners.5 We are concerned in the present analysis with 
investigating if and how variation across countries and time in the average (industry) tariffs 
applied multilaterally arising from changes in both MFN and preferential tariff rates affects the 
overall use of core NTMs. If, for example, a tariff change is induced by preferential tariff cuts 
on imports from specific sources, we do not necessarily anticipate a policy response relating 
only to NTMs on imports from sources subject to the preferential tariff cuts (WTO rules, the 
bilateral trade agreement itself or the threat of retaliation constraining the use of source-specific 
NTMs). Faced with increased imports from multiple or specific sources following a change in 
tariffs, we anticipate political economy pressures on trade policy makers to affect the 
multilateral incidence of NTMs. 
 
Data 
The data for the incidence of NTMs used to estimate the AVEs comes from UNCTAD’s 
TRAINS (Trade Analysis Information System) database but which uses the new Multi-Agency 
Support Team (MAST) system to classify NTMs, as opposed to the old Trade Control Measures 
(TCMCS). The ability to track NTMs systematically over time and use a panel estimation to 
explore the tariff-NTM relationship is a distinctive feature of this new database. The AVEs of 
core NTMs (price controls, quantity controls, monopolistic measures and technical measures) 
are estimated for 70 economies, for altogether 4949 products at 6-digit HS level over the period 
2003 to 2015 at three-year intervals (2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015). The effectively applied 
                                                          
5 By adopting a multilateral approach we reduce the data challenge of having to measure import elasticities bilaterally, 
i.e. for each import source. 
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tariff rate is used to measure tariffs using the data obtained from the UNCTAD’S TRAINS 
database at HS 6-digit product level.6 Further information on AVEs is given in Niu et al. (2018) 
and the detailed product level estimated AVEs at the product level for all countries and products 
is available at: www.nottingham.ac.uk/gep/links/index (with full data available upon 
reasonable request). 
 
4. Conceptual Framework and Empirical Methodology  
NTM-tariff relationship 
We identify in the literature review that a number of different, political economy models of 
trade policy can derive alternative relationships between tariffs and the use of NTMs. We do 
not, however, seek here to test a specific model or to test between alternative models. Rather, 
we seek to explore the empirically revealed relationship between tariffs and NTMs without 
priors on whether there is no relationship, a substitution only, complementarity only or mixture 
of substitution and complementarity in different countries and sectors.  
The intuition behind this absence of strong priors on the relationship can be illustrated 
by the theoretical work of Beverelli et al. (2014). They take product standards as the available 
NTM, and in their base model assume that NTMs such as product standards are unambiguously 
(marginal) cost increasing.7  Whether domestic producers prefer standards to be tightened (and 
marginal production costs increased) or relaxed in the face of a tariff reduction (resulting for 
example from binding regional or multilateral tariff agreements) depends on how this affects 
domestic firms’ cost competitiveness relative to foreign suppliers. Domestic firms will lobby 
for a tightening of standards (i.e., for policy substitution of the higher NTM for the reduced 
tariff to take place), when domestic firms have a cost advantage over foreign producers in 
meeting the higher standard. By contrast, the possibility of policy complementarity also exists. 
In the face of the binding tariff reduction, domestic firms have an incentive to lobby for reduced 
                                                          
6 This is in effect a weighted average of the tariff rates applied to a country’s imports from different sources, and 
therefore captures the effects of both multilateral and preferential tariff liberalization. 
7 This assumption can be relaxed to allow for both costs and benefits from standards. In which case, it is the relative 
cost-benefit or net cost (rather than cost effects) of standards for domestic and foreign producers that determines the 
incentive for domestic producers to press for increases or reductions in standards. 
 13 
 
product standards where they have a cost disadvantage relative to foreign producers in meeting 
standards. 
In this specific framework one might anticipate the relative incentive for domestic 
producers to lobby for policy substitution as opposed to policy complementarity to vary across 
sectors, with policy substitution (complementarity) the more likely outcome in sectors where 
standards are more (less) important and where domestic producers are cost competitive 
(uncompetitive). Similarly, in this specific framework one might expect greater evidence of 
policy substitution in advanced economies (with greater cost-competitiveness) than in less 
advanced economies.  
But, it is not this specific model that we seek to test here. We seek only to give intuition 
to the potential ambiguity of the NTM-tariff relationship. In reality, the constraints on the use 
of policy instruments vary across countries and sectors for legal and institutional reasons, and 
depend on the reciprocity threat from trading partners. Furthermore, our empirical analysis is 
concerned with the NTM-tariff relationship in broad terms and not the relationship between 
tariff and a specific NTM, such as product standards. It may well be the case that producers in 
advanced economies have a greater incentive to lobby for the use of product standards than 
their counterparts in developing countries for the reasons indicated above, but producers in 
developing countries may well lobby in the face of tariff reductions for other forms of NTM 
such as quantity and price controls on imports. As we can see from Figure 1, over the period of 
our study there was an increase after 2006 in the overall frequency of use of quantitative 
restrictions as well as technical measures (alongside a fall in the average tariff from around 10% 
in 2003 to about 6% in 2015). 
*** FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Empirical specification 
The empirical model used to investigate the relationship between tariffs and NTMs at the 
product line level over time is: 
 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑛𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑛𝑐 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑛𝑐𝑡,     (3) 
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where 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑛𝑐𝑡 represents the estimated AVEs of NTMs for product 𝑛 in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡. 𝛼 
is the constant intercept term in the above regression. 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑐𝑡−1 is the tariff rate for product 
𝑛  in country 𝑐  at time 𝑡 − 1 , with the sign of 𝛽1  indicating the nature of the relationship 
between NTMs and tariffs. 𝛽1 > 0 indicates that higher (lagged) tariff and NTM protection 
coexist for products across countries and time, or in other words, these policy instruments are 
complements. By contrast,  𝛽1 < 0 is consistent with NTMs substituting for tariffs, while 𝛽1 =
0 that there is no relationship between tariffs and NTMs. 𝛿𝑛𝑐 is a dummy for product 𝑛 and 
country c which controls for the product-country specific effects.  
The product-country specific (fixed) effects control for products and countries that are 
more likely to be affected by higher levels of tariffs and AVEs of NTMs for historical and 
political economy reasons. 𝜏𝑡  represents the time-specific effects included to capture time 
variant factors and shocks affecting all economies, such as the 2008 financial crisis, that 
affected world trade and trade policies over time.  𝜖𝑛𝑐𝑡 is the error term. Both NTMs and tariffs 
are estimated after applying natural logarithms, strictly as 𝑙𝑛 (1 + 𝑁𝑇𝑀) in order to avoid the 
dropping of zero observations where tariffs are zero (for the model in levels) or not subject to 
change between periods (for the model in changes). 
 Given that we have information on tariffs and AVEs over time, we can also investigate 
the response of NTM implementation to tariff change.  In addition to the above model that 
explores the tariff - NTM relationship in ‘levels’, we explore how tariff changes affect NTMs. 
The estimation of the model in terms of ‘changes’ over time may be viewed as capturing the 
decision-making procedure of trade policy makers and providing stronger evidence of a causal 
relationship, with the substitutability or complementarity between tariffs and NTMs being a 
reflection of governments’ ability and tendency to adjust policies when market conditions 
change.8 The ‘dynamic’ version of the model becomes:  
∆𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑛𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑛𝑐 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑛𝑐𝑡                      (4) 
                                                          
8 The ‘levels’ and ‘changes’ models ae viewed as alternative possible models, and eq. 2 should not be viewed 
therefore as being derived by the first differencing of eq. 1 (which would difference out the constant/fixed effects 
terms).  
 15 
 
where 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑛𝑐𝑡, 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑐𝑡, 𝛿𝑛𝑐, 𝜏𝑡 are as previously defined. Note that we use lagged tariffs 
(levels or changes) as the right-hand side variable in both versions of the model. This is in order 
to capture the delays in the trade policy decision-making and implementation process, with 
changes in tariffs inducing lobbying by domestic interest groups, possible threats of retaliation 
by trade partners, administrative review, bureaucratic approval and possibly implementation of 
new or additional NTMs; the ‘delayed’ as opposed to contemporaneous relationship between 
tariffs and NTMs provide a more appropriate basis for inferring a causal effect of the change 
in policy instrument and an alternative policy instrument. Further, note that time t in our 
analysis represents discrete points in time with three-year intervals over the period 2003-2015; 
2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015 to be precise. This allowed for the smoothing of year-specific 
shocks in the measurement of the AVEs of NTMs, and captures the slow changing nature of 
trade policy (see Amiti and Khandewal, 2013).  
As explained in section 3, the estimates of AVEs of NTMs we use in the modelling of 
the NTM-tariff relationship have the merit of being econometrically estimated as a first step, 
such that any endogeneity of NTMs with respect to imports and importantly tariffs is directly 
confronted. The estimation of the AVEs of NTMs follows Kee et al. (2009) to obtain the tariff 
equivalent of NTMs at discrete points in time. First, the ‘constrained’ level of imports, with the 
effect of tariffs allowed for, is taken as the dependent variable. Then the incidence of NTMs 
(the key explanatory variable) is further instrumented and several controls included in each 
estimated import demand function. This first-step estimation is carried out over a three-year 
span, averaging trade flows and other continuous variables to smooth out year-specific shocks.  
As part of the robustness analysis, we seek further re-assurance that the possibility of 
reverse causation means that tariffs (even lagged) are not truly exogenous in our base regression 
results by reporting difference and system GMM estimates for (3) above. We also exploit 
variation in policy commitments enshrined in the WTO negotiations affecting specific sectors. 
In particular, as documented by Schott (1994), different forms of tariff reduction were applied 
from the agreements of the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round (UR) followed an ad hoc 
approach to cut tariffs on a sector-by-sector basis and countries had to cut tariff rates on average 
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by about one-third of their pre-UR level. For some sectors, however, tariff cuts were mandated 
through a request-and-offer approach, the so-called “zero-for-zero”. “Zero-for-zero” 
negotiations took place for some specified product sectors in which the main developed 
countries first reduced their  tariffs to zero, followed by developing countries making 
substantial reduction for the same products (Schott, 1994).  
Therefore, products with higher than average tariff reduction (for peak tariffs) and with 
“zero-for-zero” measures are defined as highly affected sectors, while the remaining products 
are defined as less affected sectors. We adopt this splitting of the sample by product to re-
estimate the models (3 and 4) to explore whether there is a stronger relationship between tariffs 
and NTMs for the product set where larger tariff cuts were imposed on individual countries by 
the multilateral negotiations.  These higher cut sectors might be viewed as ones where countries 
were more constrained and where (for the current purpose) the cuts were more exogenous to 
national level trade policy setting.  
 
5. Empirical results 
Base results 
Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of the overall average tariff and average AVE of NTMs 
for the full sample; revealing tariff levels to have been subject to constant slow decline, with 
NTMs fluctuating but generally higher at the period end than at the start. This is suggestive of 
substitution by NTMs for the decline in tariffs, with non-tariff protection becoming the 
increasingly dominant source of protection overall. 
*** FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics on average tariffs and AVEs, grouping economies 
as OECD and non-OECD (with the country abbreviations elaborated on in Appendix Table 
A.1). The average AVE of NTMs and applied tariff rate again confirms that NTM protection 
level was much higher than tariffs and growing in importance over the time period for both 
OECD and non-OECD countries. Average tariff rates decreased consistently over the sample 
period for non-OECD countries. Tariff rates in OECD countries declined a little initially and 
stayed constant thereafter. For our sample period bound and applied tariff rates in industrial 
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had already been substantially reduced such that that there was limited scope for further 
reduction. Both the average tariff rate and AVE level (and therefore level of overall protection) 
were also much higher in general in non-OECD than OECD economies. This is in contrast to 
the argument of Hoekman and Nicita (2011) that NTMs increase with income per capita, 
mirroring the declining importance of tariffs; an argument that would lead one to expect a 
greater likelihood of substitution between these trade policy instruments for developed than 
developing countries. 
*** TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
*** TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Table 2 reports the base estimates of eq. (1), with AVEs regressed on lagged levels 
(columns 1, 2 and 3) and changes in tariffs (columns 4, 5 and 6); in each case initially without 
fixed effects, then with only product-country fixed effects and finally with both product-country 
and time fixed effects included in the specification. In levels, the pooled OLS regression with 
no fixed effects controlled for (col.1) generates a positively signed and statistically significant 
coefficient on the tariff variable, suggesting complementarity between tariff and non-tariff trade 
policy instruments. However, the sign on lagged tariff levels becomes significantly negative 
for the panel estimation with product-country fixed effects (col.2), though the magnitude of the 
negative coefficient is reduced markedly by the inclusion also of time fixed effects (col.3). For 
the alternative specification using lagged changes in tariffs as the explanatory variable, a 
negative and significant coefficient is obtained with or without fixed effects and for the 
alternative configurations of the fixed effects. Overall, our estimated base panel models provide 
evidence consistent with a substitutional relationship between tariffs and NTMs for the full 
sample of countries over this time period, with falling tariffs (typically) being followed by rises 
in NTM levels.9  
Heterogeneity in the Tariff-NTM Relationship 
                                                          
9 A similar conclusion is drawn if separate product and country effects are used rather than product-country fixed 
effects.  
 18 
 
Given the greater use of tariffs and greater overhang of bound over applied tariffs in developing 
countries and given the possibility of greater administrative capacity in developed countries to 
implement NTMs, one might be concerned that the results in Table 1 for the full sample hide 
important differences in the NTM-tariff relationship between developed and developing 
countries.10 In Table 3 we explore heterogeneity in the NTM-tariff relationship between country 
groupings, specifically between sub-samples of OECD and non-OECD countries and using the 
preferred panel specification which includes both product-country and time fixed effects. 
*** TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE *** 
The finding of policy substitution from the full sample holds in general for both OECD 
and non-OECD countries. A negative coefficient is found on the lagged tariff variable in both 
the levels and changes specification for both OECD and non-OECD countries, and with 
significance in all but column 4 (the changes specification applied to non-OECD countries). 
The fact that an absolutely larger coefficient is obtained in both the levels and changes models 
for OECD countries and that an insignificant coefficient is obtained for non-OECD countries 
in the case of the ‘dynamic’ model indicates that there is stronger support for the substitution 
relationship between NTMs and tariffs for OECD countries than for non-OECD countries.  
Taken together these findings reveal some divergence from extant studies, which 
predominantly find NTM-tariff policy substitution to be a developing country phenomenon (see 
Moore and Zanardi, 2011; Ronen, 2017). It should be noted, however, that previous work tends 
to be concerned with the trade-off between tariffs and a specific type of NTM or to be reliant 
on cross-country evidence only. Here our finding is based on a comprehensive measure of 
NTMs and on estimates from a panel of cross country and over time information. 
*** TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE *** 
In Table 4 we investigate further whether and how the tariff-NTM relationship varies 
across sectors in OECD and non-OECD countries. It is clear from Table 4 that the overall 
                                                          
10 The requirements for tariff reduction in  multilateral negotiations have been different for developed and developing 
countries, including in the Uruguay Round, (Schott, 1994). Although Moore and Zanardi (2011) found that tariff 
reductions resulted in higher anti-dumping NTM incidence for developing economies, there are range of NTMs such 
are product standards that are more likely to be applied by developed countries. 
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substitution result drawn from the previous results is in fact driven mainly by the manufacturing 
sector and more strongly in OECD than non-OECD countries. We obtain significantly negative 
coefficients in the case of the ‘levels’ model for the manufacturing sector in both OECD and 
non-OECD countries, albeit with a stronger substitutional relationship for OECD 
manufacturing than non-OECD manufacturing. By contrast, the estimated ‘levels’ model 
generates an insignificant relationship for OECD agriculture and a significantly positive 
relationship between NTMs and lagged tariffs for non-OECD agriculture. The negative overall 
relationship for non-OECD countries indicated by Table 3 is in fact masking a mixed 
relationship of complementarity for non-OECD agriculture and substitution for non-OECD 
manufacturing. Although this finding does not also hold for the ‘changes’ model, for which we 
find no significant relationship between tariffs and NTMs for either sector in the case of the 
non-OECD countries. By contrast, we find significant negative signs on lagged tariff changes 
for both OECD agriculture and manufacture sectors. 
 
Table 5 shows heterogeneity in the NTM-tariff relationship through an additional sample-
splitting across different sectors, as identified on the basis of commitments under the Uruguay 
Round (agreed in 1994 and implemented over 6 (10) years post-agreement by developed 
(developing) countries). As highlighted in section 4, ‘zero-for-zero’ negotiations took place for 
some specified product sectors, with developed countries reducing their  tariffs to zero first, 
followed by developing economies committing to a reduction for the same products (Schott, 
1994). We split the sample into two groups: products with above average tariff cuts and 
products with below average tariff cuts. The first type includes products with above average 
tariff cuts as well as products with zero-for-zero commitments, while the second type includes 
the rest of the products.11 Products with above average tariff reduction cover 67% of the sample 
while products with below average tariff reduction cover about 33%. Given the differences in 
commitments and implementation speed between developed and developing countries, we 
                                                          
11 Product groups with above-average tariff cuts are: metals; mineral products, precious stones and metals; electric 
machinery; wood, pulp, paper, and furniture; nonelectric machinery; chemicals and photographic supplies; and 
“other” manufactured articles. Products with zero-for-zero commitments are: pharmaceuticals, construction 
equipment, steel, distilled spirits, certain furniture, medical equipment, farm machinery, beer, toys and paper.  
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retain the OECD/non-OECD sub-samples for the implementation of this split product/sector. 
Indeed one might anticipate evidence of a stronger substitutional relationship between NTMs 
and tariffs for sectors subject to larger tariff cuts, and possibly some difference between country 
types.12  
*** TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE *** 
The results in Table 5 continue to provide evidence in support of a substitutional 
relationship between tariffs and NTMs, with negative signs (with one exception of an 
insignificant positive sign) on the lagged tariff variable in levels or changes specification and 
for above and below average UR tariff cuts for both OECD and non-OECD countries. There is, 
however, interesting variation in significance levels and the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient in different sub-samples. In the levels specification there is an absolutely larger, and 
consistently significant, negative coefficient in the case of above average tariff-cutting sectors 
for both OECD and non-OECD countries. By contrast, there is a smaller (albeit still significant) 
substitutional effect found for below average tariff cutting sectors in the case of the OECD 
countries and no significant relationship in the case of the non-OECD countries for the low cut 
sectors; evidence therefore consistent with a stronger and more comprehensive substitutional 
relationship for OECD than non-OECD countries.  
The conclusion above does not hold in the case of the ‘changes’ model. All the estimated 
coefficients on the tariff variable are negative, but only significant in the case of below average 
cut sectors in the case of non-OECD countries. By taking changes the sample period is truncated, 
however, and importantly the change in the dependent variable starts with the change over the 
period 2006-2009 which is after the scheduled full implementation of the UR tariff cuts (2000 
for OECD countries and 2004 for non-OECD countries). This constrains the usefulness of the 
changes model to comment on the heterogeneity which we wish to explore. The levels model 
is more informative for the purpose at hand, and offers results in line with expectations. 
 
                                                          
12 This is for the same reasons as indicated above for differences in the overall relationship for OECD and non-
OECD countries and/or because the speed and degree of implementation of the tariff cuts differed between these 
country groups. 
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Further robustness analysis 
In order to check whether any reverse causation from lagged tariffs to the contemporaneous 
AVE level of NTMs means that we strictly cannot treat our tariff variable in our base results as 
exogenous, we report on difference GMM and system GMM estimations of the static model 
(eq. 3).13 Both estimators are designed for a small number of time periods and large number of 
units (here countries), where independent variables are correlated with past and possibly present 
realizations of the error term. System GMM imposes additional constraints, implying in the 
current context that trade policy in the sampled countries is not too far from steady state 
conditions over the sampled period. However, the system GMM estimator may have lower bias 
and higher efficiency than the first difference GMM estimator for the relatively small number 
of countries in the present sample. 
*** TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE *** 
We report both the difference and system GMM estimations of (3) for the full sample in 
Table 6. The coefficient on lagged tariffs by both estimation methods is quite similar; negative 
and significant at the 1% level. This finding is consistent with the trade policy substitution result 
obtained in the base, panel regressions. Indeed, the GMM estimations suggest a stronger 
substitution effect, with an absolutely larger negative coefficient on the tariff variable. To 
confirm our findings from the base modelling for the various sub-samples reported on above, 
we also report in appendix table A-2 the system GMM estimates where the sample is split by 
economy type (OECD and non-OECD), product (subject to above and below average tariff cuts 
in Uruguay Round), and by sector (manufacturing and agriculture). We find support for the 
trade policy substitution hypothesis for these sub-samples. 
 
6. Conclusions 
With the proliferation of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements in recent years, tariffs have 
fallen to a relatively low level and NTMs are increasingly used as the main instrument of trade 
policy. In this paper, the aim is to formally investigate whether NTMs overall are substituting 
                                                          
13 The difference GMM version of (3) is equivalent to the dynamic version of the model (4) with a lagged dependent 
variable added. 
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for tariffs, using directly comparable tariff equivalent NTMs at the product-level for 80 
countries over the period of 2003 to 2015. We employ a panel methodology to investigate this 
relationship across countries and time, allowing for the lagged adjustment of NTMs to tariffs 
(modelled in levels and changes). This empirical strategy offers a credible basis for offering a 
causal interpretation to the estimated relationship between the AVEs of NTMs and tariff rates 
at the detailed product level, using AVEs of NTMs estimated in consistent and rigorous manner.  
In summary, our findings are strongly consistent with trade policy substitution being 
present overall between NTMs and tariffs for the sampled countries and sample period, with 
effect tending to be stronger for the manufacturing sector, for OECD than non-OECD countries 
and for those sectors/products subject to higher than average multilateral tariff cuts. This 
finding is also confirmed by the GMM estimates. Although, in the case of non-OECD countries, 
we find some evidence of a mixed relationship in the case of the ‘levels’ model, with tariff and 
NTMs being complements in the case of non-OECD agriculture and substitutes in the case of 
non-OECD manufacturing.  
With both our variables in natural logarithms we can interpret the coefficients on the 
tariff variable in our estimated models as elasticities. The average elasticity for the observed 
substitution relationship is apparently low overall, and not absolutely greater than -0.28 for 
specific sub-samples. One might conclude therefore that the NTM-tariff relationship is one 
subject to imperfect and incomplete trade policy substitution. It needs to be recognized, 
however, that tariff levels are on average much lower than the tariff-equivalent of NTMs, as 
demonstrated in Fig. 1 and in Table 1. With average tariffs typically of 10% or less in this 
period, a 10% decline in tariffs involves an absolute decline in tariffs of 1% point or less. With 
an average AVE of NTMs typically in excess of 40%, an elasticity of -0.25 implies a 1% 
percentage point increase in the AVE for each 10% decrease in tariffs. In absolute terms, 
therefore, the trade policy substitution is much more complete! 
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Table 1: Average AVE and Applied Tariff in OECD and non-OECD Countries 
 (coefficient form: 2003-2015) 
Country 
Category 
Countries (ISO3) Year 
NTM 
(1) 
Tariff 
(2) 
Non-
OECD 
countries 
AFG, ARG, BEN, BFA, BOL, BRA, BRN, 
CHN, CIV, COL, CPV, CRI, CUB, DOM, 
ECU, EGY, GHA, GIN, GMB, GTM, HKG, 
HND, IDN, IND, JAM, KAZ, KHM, LBN, 
LKA, MAR, MDG, MLI, MUS, MWI, MYS, 
NER, NGA, NIC, NPL, PAK, PAN, PER, PHL, 
PRY, RUS, RWA, SEN, SGP, SLV, TGO, 
THA, TTO, TUN, TZA, UKR, URY, VEN, 
VNM, ZAF 
2003 0.40 0.12 
2006 0.32 0.09 
2009 0.52 0.09 
2012 0.37 0.08 
2015 0.55 0.07 
OECD countries 
AUS, CAN, CHL, EUN, ISR, JPN, KOR, MEX, 
NZL, TUR, USA 
2003 0.21  0.06  
2006 0.21  0.04  
2009 0.35  0.04  
2012 0.26  0.04  
2015 0.41  0.04  
Note：The second column shows “ISO3” codes for countries in each category.  
 
Table 2: Base Results: AVEs of NTMs Regressed on Lagged Tariffs (Levels and Changes) 
Independent variable  
Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 + 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 + ∆𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln (1 + tarifft−1) 0.17*** 
（0.00） 
-0.22*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
 
  
ln (1 + ∆tarifft−1)    -0.05*** 
（0.01） 
-0.05*** 
（0.01） 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
Constant 0.24*** 
(0.00) 
0.27*** 
(0.00) 
0.25*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
Observations 950,037 950,037 950,037 753,645 753,645 753,645 
Product-Country Effects NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Time-specific Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES 
R-squared 0.002 0.006 0.03 0.0001 0.0001 0.04 
Wald Test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Country-product group  252,965 252,965  227,900 227,900 
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Note: Regressions in columns 1 and 4 are uses pooled OLS. Regressions in columns 2-3 and 5-6 are estimated 
using panel fixed effects approach, with product-country specific effects. Time dummies are included in regressions 
in columns 3 and 6. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level. 
 
Table 3: Results for OECD and non-OECD Countries (Levels and Changes)  
 Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 + 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 + ∆𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) 
Independent variable  
OECD Non-OECD OECD Non-OECD 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln (1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓t−1) -0.12*** -0.06***   
 (0.02) (0.01)   
ln (1 + Δ𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓t−1)   -0.10* -0.01 
   (0.02) (0.01) 
Constant 0.16*** 0.28*** -0.09*** -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
Observations 205,066 744,971 163,191 590,454 
Product-Country Effects YES YES YES YES 
Time-specific Effects YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Country-product group 51,171 201,787 49,559 178,341 
Note: The regressions are re-run for sub-samples by dividing economies into OECD and non-OECD for lagged tariff, levels 
and changes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 
Table 4: Results for Agricultural and Manufacturing Sectors and Economies (Levels and 
Changes)  
 Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) 
Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 + ∆𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) 
PANEL A: 
OECD countries 
 
Agricultural 
sector 
Manufacturing 
sector 
Agricultural 
sector 
Manufacturing 
sector 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln (1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓t−1) -0.02 -0.23***   
 (0.03) (0.02)   
ln (1 + Δ𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓t−1)   -0.10** -0.09*** 
   (0.04) (0.03) 
Constant 0.19*** 0.16*** -0.18*** -0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Observations 24,932 180,134 18,237 144,954 
Product-Country Effects YES YES YES YES 
Time-specific Effects YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Country-product group 6,618 44,560 6,302 43,257 
PANEL B: 
Non-OECD countries 
Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) 
Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 + ∆𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) 
Agricultural 
sector 
Manufacturing 
sector 
Agricultural 
sector 
Manufacturing 
sector 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
ln (1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓t−1) 0.05** -0.09***   
 (0.02) (0.01)   
ln (1 + Δ𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓t−1)   -0.05 -0.01 
   (0.03) (0.01) 
Constant 0.39*** 0.26*** -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Observations 79,983 664,988 57,402 533,052 
Product-Country Effects YES YES YES YES 
Time-specific Effects YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 
Country-product group 23,565 178,222 19,743 158,598 
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Note: The regressions are for sub-samples splitting economies into OECD and non-OECD and sectors into sectors with 
agricultural sectors and manufactured sectors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level. 
 
Table 5: AVEs of NTMs Regressed on Lagged Tariffs for Different Sectors and 
Economies (Levels and Changes)  
 Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 + 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 + ∆𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) 
PANEL A: 
OECD countries 
 
Above average 
UR cut 
Below average  
UR cut 
Above average 
UR cut 
Below average 
 UR cut 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln (1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓t−1) -0.28*** -0.07***   
 (0.03) (0.02)   
ln (1 + Δ𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓t−1)   -0.28 -0.04 
   (0.06) (0.03) 
Constant 0.16*** 0.16*** -0.07*** -0.13*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 132,407 72,659 106,794 56,397 
Product-Country Effects YES YES YES YES 
Time-specific Effects YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Country-product group 32,514 18,664 31,639 17,920 
PANEL B: 
Non-OECD countries 
Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 + 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 + ∆𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) 
Above average 
UR cut 
Below average  
UR cut 
Above average 
UR cut 
Below average 
 UR cut 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
ln (1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓t−1) -0.16*** 0.01   
 (0.01) (0.01)   
ln (1 + Δ𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓t−1)   -0.01 -0.03** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.01*** -0.05*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 507,734 237,237 407,409 183,045 
Product-Country Effects YES YES YES YES 
Time-specific Effects YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.02 
Country-product group 135,175 66,612 120,729 57,612 
Note: The regressions are for sub-samples splitting economies into OECD and non-OECD and sectors into sectors with above 
average tariff cuts based on the Uruguay Round and those with a below average tariff cut. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
Table 6: GMM Estimates: AVE of NTMs Regressed on Lagged Tariffs 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛 (1 + 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑡) 
Differenced  GMM System GMM 
ln (1 + tarifft−1) -0.25*** 
(0.01) 
-0.22*** 
(0.02) 
Constant - -6.97*** 
(0.32) 
Observations 768,305 925,874 
Time-specific Effects YES YES 
Country-product group 226,192 248,485 
F-test p value 0.00 0.00 
Sargen test p value 0.00 0.00 
Hansen Test p value 0.00 0.00 
AB Test for AR(1) p value 0.00 0.00 
AB Test for AR(2) p value 0.00 0.00 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Sargan test of exogeneity of instrument subsets. 
Hansen Test of overidentification. Lagged NTM not reported.  
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Figure 1: Evolution of Sample Average Frequency Index of NTMs and Tariff (2003-2015) 
 
Note: Frequency index of NTMs and tariff is averaged across countries with available data for each year. 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of Sample Average Tariffs and AVE of NTMs (2003-2015) 
 
 
